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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MUSIC SERVICE CORPORATION,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.

vs.

10704

CLEO WALTON,
Defendant-Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Statement of the Kind of Case

This is an action quieting title to a strip of land
located along the adjoining boundary lines of the
parties' property.
Disposition In Lower Court

This case was tried to the court, judgment
rendered in favor of defendant, and plaintiff takes
his appeal.
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Relief Sought on Appeal
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the trial court's judg-

ment with judgment in its favor as a matter of law
ordered and a remand to the lower court for assessment of damages in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant.
Statement of Facts

Defendant is unable to agree with the statement
of facts as contained in plaintiff's brief and will therefore restate the facts with the purpose in mind of
giving to the court a narrative statement accurately
presenting the evidence on which the trial court
relied in finding in favor of defendant and against
plaintiff.
Parties to this action are the owners of adjoining
tracts of land located at approximately 200 West 3900
South Street, Salt Lake County, Utah. The tract
owned by plaintiff is located on the east and the tract
owned by defendant is located on the west. Exhibit
D-11, an aerial photograph, accurately shows the
general location of the property with the building
on it which is denominated P. L. Henderson & Sons,
Inc., being the plaintiff's property, and the property
with the wrecked cars on it is the defendant's
property.
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Defendant purchased the property in May, 1959
and since that time has occupied it continuously and
has used the property which is in dispute during the
whole period of time. (R. 110-A, R. 115) Shortly
after Walton purchased his property, P. L. Henderson bought the property to the east, his actual purchase being in February, 1960. He occupied the
property from February, 1960 to February, 1965.
( R. 81 ) vVhen Henderson purchased the property
there was a fence along the west borderline of the
property purchased. It was not a chain link fence,
but was denominated as a hog wire fence. Henderson
replaced the hog wire fence with the chain link
fence. CR. 82) At the time he replaced the chain
link fence there were two fences west of the barbed
wire fence, one approximately 10 to 12 feet further
west, and 18 feet further from that fence was a fence
for Walton's dogs. (R. 82) Henderson removed the
two fences that were west of the dog fence. In the
spring of 1960 Mr. Henderson and Mr. Walton met
at the property and Mr. Henderson took down the
fences, filled in the property with a bulldozer, and
installed the chain link fence. ( R. 83) At the time of
the installation of the chain link fence, Henderson
claimed that the line on his property was 10 feet
further west from the place where the chain link
fence was erected. Walton did not agree that
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Henderson owned that additional 10 feet. CR. 84)
Henderson had no further use for the ground to the
west of the chain link fence, and after the dispute
Henderson placed the chain link fence in a place that
was satisfactory to him. CR. 85) From the time the
chain link fence was placed on the property, vValton
occupied the property to the west of the chain link
fence. The location of the fence was satisfactory to
Walton. One of the old fences was on the line where
Henderson ran his chain link fence. CR. 8 7) Defendant Walton testified that he was willing to have tllP.
chain link fence mark the boundary and that he
considered it the boundary since it was placed in by
Mr. Henderson. CR. 112)
The County Recorder's plats do not reveal any
land separating the vValton land from the Henderson
land. CSee Exhibit D-10) The land purchased by
defendant formerly belonged to one David Hansen
and had been surveyed by a licensed surveyor and
witness, Arnold W. Coon, in May, 1959. CR. 95 and
96) Mr. Coon prepared Exhibit D-12. Examination
of various maps of the property, Mr. Coon testified,
showed a confusion between the properties as to
where the property lines existed. CR. 99) Coon's survey revealed that the present chain link fence is on
the line of the fence which was most easterly of the
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two fences identified by Henderson. The witness
Coon testified that he had examined the old plats
of the land between the two pieces of property, and
the chain link fence and the westernmost fence, and
that there was no deed to show ownership to that
strip of land, that his examination went back four or
five years. CR. 101 - 102) Coon further testified that
the Henderson property would be approximately 3
feet wider when the chain link fence is used as its
west houndary than the description contained in
Henderson's deed. The strip between the two properties, when the Henderson property is measured from
the east boundary line and the Walton property is
measured from its west boundary line, is approximately 12 feet. CR. 103-104)
Witness Jean Hansen testified that she had been
familiar with the property in dispute from 1948
until 1961, and no use was made of the property
between the two fences during those years. CR. 106107) She testified that there was sufficient distance
between the two old fences to lead a horse through,
"but nothing but a horse went through as long as
I remember." CR. 107) She further testified that the
strip was completely obstructed by vines and bushes
in 1961. Mrs. Hansen was present when the old
fences were taken out and the new fence placed there
by Mr. Henderson. CR. 108)
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On the 13th of Febrnary, 1964 P. L. Henderson
& Sons, Inc. quit-claimed to White Investment Company, Inc. a strip of ground immediately west of the
chain link fence, 9.24 feet in width. (See Exhibit
P-4) On the 14th of December, 1964 M. Kenneth
White and Ada Marie White, his wife, obtained a
deed from C. W. Wilkins and Lucy A. Wilkins, his
wife, covering a strip of land 11.48 feet wide, which
appears to be along the area now in dispute. (See
Exhibit P-U The description in the Wilkins' deed,
however, refers to old fence lines and the testimony
is without dispute that on the 14th of December,
1964, the date the deed bears, there were no old
fence lines in the area where the property is locatd
which is disputed. The old fences which had been
in prior to 1960 had been removed, the new chain
link fence constrncted, and the area filled in and
was being used by defendant Walton.
Neither P. L. Henderson nor Wilkins, according
to the evidence, have any chain of title to the land
which is in dispute. Court found that at the time of
the deed by Wilkins to White, Wilkins did not own
the property described and had no chain of title to
the property giving any color of title to Wilkins,
and that the Wilkins' deed is what is denominated
as a "wild deed". The court found that P. L. Henderson and defendant Cleo Walton had agreed that the
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chain link fence built by Henderson would mark
the boundaries between their properties and each
has occupied to the chain link fence since the time
it was constructed, that because of the P. L.
Henderson-Walton agreement that the chain link
fence would mark the boundary line of the property,
the quit claim deed from Henderson to White Investment did not convey any property since Henderson
had no property in the land west of the chain link
fence. (See Findings of Fact) The court then quieted
title to Walton in the strip of land west of the chain
link fence, which is described and given a meets and
bounds course in the Conclusions of Law and in the
Decree of the court.
The court further found that the plaintiff had
suffered no damages by reason of '"alton's occupancy of the land to the west of the chain link fence.
From this judgment the appeal is taken.
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ARGUMENT
Point I
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED ANY TITLE
TO THE STRIP IN DISPUTE

The evidence on which the trial court could rely
shows that since 1948 the strip of land which is
approximately 12 feet wide and which lies east of
the meets and bounds of defendant's ground and
west of the meets and bounds description of plaintiff's
ground, was not occupied or used until Henderson,
plaintiff's predecessor in interest, removed the fences
and put up his chain link fence. Since that time in
1960 defendant has occupied and used the strip. CR.
106-107) No deed to the strip was of record and
the County Recorder's plat does not show any gap
between the parties' adjoining property lines. (See
Exhibit D-10) White, predecessor in interest to
plaintiff, attempted to establish a right to the strip
by obtaining a deed from C. W. Wilkins and Lucy A.
Wilkins describing a strip 11.48 feet wide in December, 1964, (See Exhibit P-n and also obtained a quit
claim deed from Henderson to the strip on the 13th
of February, 1964. Neither Wilkins nor Henderson
had any title to the strip as disclosed by their deeds.
CR. 101-102)
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In 1960 when Henderson went on the property,
the dispute as to where the west line of his property
ran as it related to the east line of Walton's property,
arose. The testimony is without dispute that Henderson and Walton met in the vicinity of the property
line and in the disputed property and Henderson
made his claim, Walton disputed the claim, and they
agreed that the chain link fence should be run in its
present location. This divided the 12 foot strip, 3
feet to Henderson and 9.4 feet to Walton. Since 1960
Henderson occupied to the chain link fence on the
east, Walton occupied to the chain link fence on the
west.
With no record title and no title by reason of
adverse possession, plaintiffs cannot and have not
established any title to the strip of land.
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Point II
DEFENDANTS HAVE ESTABLISHED TITLE BY
BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT

The evidence indicates that the descriptions of
the adjoining properties leave a strip approximately
12 feet in width between the plaintiff's and defendant's property. This strip is not shown on the County
Recorder's plats and there was no chain of title to
the strip presented for the trial court's consideration.
Plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Henderson,
defendant Walton divided the 12 foot strip, 3
to Henderson and 9 feet to Walton, and along
dividing line Henderson constructed the chain
fence.

and
feet
this
link

This boundary line by agreement is completely
undisputed. Henderson testified that he removed all
the old fences and put in the chain link fence, and
therefore he cannot claim that this line was not a
satisfactory property line. Walton consented and so
testified to the Henderson fence construction. He has
continued since 1960 to the time of the filing of the
action and to the present time in possession so that
there is a boundary line by agreement clearly marked
by a fence which has been recognized for a number
of years.
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The earliest American case that respondent has
been able to find which discusses the principle here
involved was decided by the Superior Court of Delaware in the fall session of 184 7. It is entitled James
Lindsay vs. Peter Springer, 4 Del. 547 (Harrington's
Report). It is exactly in point on the fact that the
adjoining parties discovered a strip of land between
their two lines which was not covered by the deed
of either. They agreed to divide the strip and marked
the line, moving their fences on to the line so agreed
upon. Later one of the parties attempted to renege
on this agreement, saying that the surveyor had
made a mistake and that he would not abide by the
new fence line. The defendant argued that because
the establishment of the boundary line was by parol
agreement, it would not be conclusive unless it was
acquiesed in by the parties for a period of at least
twenty years. The court, in disposing of this contention, stated as follows: (P. 550)
"If a written agreement were made, under circumstances similar to those which existed in
the present case, to establish and abide by a
boundary line, which is immediately located
by the parties, pursuant to such agreement;
no doubt the parties would be bound by it,
as well after the lapse of one year, as of twenty
years. But as the contract in such cases is not
required to be in writing, (Boyd's Lessee vs.
Graves, 4 Wheat. 517; Kip vs. Norton, 12
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iv end. 130 > an express parol agreement fairly

made in a like case, by virtue of vvhich the
boundary is established and immediately
followed up by possession, would have t:he
same effect, of precluding the parties of afterward controverting it. The lapse of twenLy
years is merely matter of evidence to establish
a particular fact."
A subsequent case reviewing and rec1tmg the
law on boundary lines is Farr vs. Vloolfolk, 118 Ga.
277, 1; SE 2JU. h1 this ca:-;c an argume11t was mad(·
that the statute of frauds prohibited the establishment of a boundary line by parol agreement between
adjacent property owners. The Supreme Court of
Georgia held otherwise and in disposing of this question stated as follows:

"This rule has been thus stated: 'Where the
boundary line between two estates is indefinite
or uncertain, the owners may by parol agreement establish a boundary line and the line
thus defined will afterwards control their
deeds, notwithstanding the statute of fraud.'
4 Am. and Eng. Enc. L. (2d Edition). See,
also, 5 Cyc. 931."
The earliest case respondent has discovered
exactly in point in the western jurisdictions is Cavanaugh vs. Jackson, 91 Cal. 580, 27 P. 931. This case
involved a parol agreement to establish a dividing
line between adjoining plots. The Supreme Court of
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California, P. 931, stated the rules in the following
language:
"It is well settled that where the owners of
contiguous lots by parol a~reement mutually
establish a dividing line, and thereafter use
and occupy their respective tracts according
to it for any period of time, such agreement
is not within the statute of frauds, and it cannot afterwards be controverted by the parties
of their successors in interest."
The earliest Utah case which discusses the
principles involved in boundary lines by agreement
or acquiescence is Holmes vs. Judge, 31 U. 269, 87 P.
1009. In this case there was no evidence concerning
the original parties' intentions or agreements at the
time the boundary line fences and improvements
were constructed. The Supreme Court of Utah discussed at some length the fact that a party may agree
as to the boundary line of their properties, and if
possession is taken immediately and monuments
erected to mark the boundary line, it will govern the
true property line. It held that long acquiescence in
such lines might establish an agreement where other
evidence does not exist to establish it. Held that the
line thus shown by improvements and fence and
acquiesced in by the owners for a long period of time,
was the true boundary. A subsequent Utah case,
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Young vs. Hyland, 37 U. 229, 108 P.1124, the Utah
Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles announced
in Holmes vs. Judge, supra, and citing two other Utah
cases, l\1oyer vs. Langton, 37 U. 9, 106 P. 508, and
Rydalch vs. Anderson, 37 U. 99, 107 P. 25, stated the
principle applicable in the following language:
CP.234)
"In those cases the doctrine is recognized,
where the owner of adjoining lands occupy
their respective premises up to a certain line
which they recognize and acquiesce in as their
boundary line for a period of time, they and
their grantees will not be permitted to deny
that the boundary line thus recognized is the
true line of division between their properties."
In the case of Rydalch vs. Anderson, 37 U. 99,
107 P. 25, this court discussed the question of whether
or not an agreement to establish a boundary line was
binding upon the parties and cited several authorities
where a long period of time had elapsed. The court
then at Page 109 cited the following rule:
"In a number of jurisdictions it seems to be
well settled that where a boundary line is
established by agreement of two adjoining
owners title up to the line thus fixed may be
acquired by estoppel, as well as by adverse
possession. Where joining owners agree upon
a boundary line and enter into possession and
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improve the land according to the line thus
agreed upon, the parties will be precluded
from afterwards disputing that the line thus
agreed upon is a true one, even if the statute of
limitations is not run."
In ruling upon the facts in the case, the Utah
Supreme Court stated: CP. 111)
"Under the facts in this case we think the
parties had a perfect right to agree upon a
boundary line between their claims as they
did. They also had the right to readjust this
boundary line when the section line was established which in view of the recitals contained
in the first patent referred to, issued to William
C. Rydalch, must have been at least some time
prior to 18 71. It must therefore be assumed
that both Mr. Kimball and Mr. William C.
Rydalch knew that the section line had been
established and where it was, but that in
view of the improvements they had made, or
for some other good reason, concluded to continue the boundary line marked by the fence
as the permanent boundary line between their
lands. By doing so they did not contravene
any public statute, nor offend against any
public policy, so far as we are aware."
This court reviewed the law of the state in the
case of Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 U. 57, 276 P. 912, an&
recognized that the law of boundary lines established
by adverse possession or acquiescence are as binding
upon the parties as boundary lines conforming to
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meets and bounds descriptions in deeds. In 1951 the
Court in an extensive review of all of the prior
decisions, reaffirmed the principles set forth. In
Brown vs. Milliner, 120 U. 16, 232 P. 2d 202, it stated
the law of the State of Utah in the following
language: CP. 24)
"A review of the Utah cases involving boundary disputes reveals that it had long been
recognized in this state that when the location
of the true boundary between two adjoining
tracts of land is unknown, uncertain or in dispute, owners thereof may, by parol agreement,
establish a boundary line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and their grantees."
A recent court decision restates the prior law of
the state as outlined in the cited decision. It is Ekberg
et ux vs. Bates et ux, 121 U. 123, 239 P. 2d 205. The
court reiterated the prior holdings that owners of
adjoining tracts of land whose true boundary lines
are unknown, in dispute or uncertain, may by parol
agreement establish boundary lines which are binding on themselves and their successors in interest.
The court has in three very recent cases had
occasion to reconsider the boundary line law of the
State of Utah as it is affected by parol agreements
and acquiescence. Those cases are Harding vs. Allen,
10 U. 2d 370, 353 P. 2d 911; Nunley vs. Walker, 13 U.
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2d 105, 369 P. 2d 117; and King vs. Fronk, 14 U. 2d
135, 378 P. 2d 893.
This court held that upon showing a visible,
persisting, alleged acquiesced-in boundary over long
period of time, party assailing boundary must show
lack of agreement between neighbors, establishing
the line on the visible marked boundary.
Respondent has been unable to find any law
inconsistent with the principles which he seeks to
have applied by this Court. They are the principles
applied by the trial court in the decision here on
appeal.

Conclusion
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the trial court should be affirmed and the court
should award respondent his costs on appeal.

Respectfully submitted this ...... day of................... .
------------------------, 19 ........ .

DWIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Respondent
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

